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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Background to the Study 
 
While corruption affects all countries throughout the world, developing countries have been 
affected the most. It is estimated that developing countries lose $20-$40 billion in stolen 
public assets per year.1  Uganda, like many other African and developing countries, is faced 
with the vice of corruption. Corrupt practices in Uganda mainly occur in the public sector, 
with economic development programmes funded through foreign aid, public procurement 
and local government being most prone to such practices. Petty corruption is also common 
in government departments. Corrupt acts also occur to a lesser extent in the private sector 
and in non-governmental organisations. As a result, corruption in Uganda can be described 
adequately as routine and widespread, manifesting itself in the dealings between the public 
sector, individuals and firms. 
The World Bank in 2005 estimated corruption related losses in the country to be at $204 
million,2while the Global Integrity Report put the amount at $400 million.3 It was reported 
also that the country loses about $250 million to corruption annually.4 In 2013, the East 
African Bribery Index ranked Uganda top among the countries affected most by corruption 
in the region.5 
                                                          
1 Greenberg et al (2009).  
2 World Bank (2009). 
3  www.socialwatch.org. 
4 www.newvision.co.ug. 
5 Transparency International – Kenya ‘East Africa Bribery Index’ 2013. 
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In November 2012, for instance, donor countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and Sweden suspended their financial support to Uganda after $25.7 
million, designated for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction programmes in northern 
Uganda, were diverted by officials in the Office of the Prime Minister and squandered.6  
Pursuant to this occurrence, the donor agencies and partners insisted that the resumption 
of aid was conditional upon the establishment of control systems within government 
departments, full investigation and prosecution of the matter, and recovery of the 
misappropriated funds.7  Other incidents of corruption that have occurred in Uganda in 
recent years include the misappropriation of $4.5 million meant for the Global Fund to fight 
AIDS,Tuberculosis and Malaria,8 and $800 000 stolen from the Global Alliance for Vaccine 
and Immunisation.9 
Despite the high level of corruption in Uganda, inquiries into allegations of corruption hardly 
yield any results. Reportsand investigations into political corruption, such as police 
misconduct and corruption (2000), Junk Helicopters (2001), URA (2003), Global Fund (2006), 
National Social Security Fund (2007), GAVI Fund (2007) and The National Population, 
Databanks and Identification Solutions Investigations have resulted neitherin prosecutions 
and convictionsnorin the recovery of stolen funds.10 
Many times powerful public officials involved in these corruption related offences are not 
prosecuted or convicted. Often there are claims of insufficient evidence to found an 
indictment or conviction. Further, statistics and reports show that most of the convictions 
secured at the Anti-Corruption Court are of lower level public officials who work at the 
                                                          
6 Human Rights Watch(2013) 1. 
7 Human Rights Watch (2013) 1. 
8 Human Rights Watch (2013) 1.  
9 Human Rights Watch (2013) 1.  
10 Ruhweza (2008) 15. 
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technical level, usually convicted for embezzling sums averaging $ 1300.11 However, high 
ranking officials in the central government, who are accused often of misusing much bigger 
sums of money ($25 000 to $120 000 on average),12 escape charges or conviction, through 
the politics of patronage and syndicates within the public service which conceal evidence of 
corruption and fraud.  Also, such officials may threaten prosecutors and potential witnesses 
or bribe investigators and prosecutors.13 
According to a prosecutor in the Anti-Corruption Court: 
“Untouchables. Come rain, come shine, they are never going to Court, not while there’s 
somebody close to them in power. That is because of the politics involved.”14 
 
The former head of the Anti-Corruption Court also remarked thatthe Court was fed up with 
trying lower level officers while corrupt powerful officials were left unpunished.15The Anti-
Corruption Court in Uganda also faces staffing shortages and financial constraints. As of 
June 2014, there were three judges, one registrar, two chief magistrates and four grade one 
magistrates for the Court.16 The Inspectorate of Government and the Directorate of Public 
Prosecutions, mandated to prosecute acts of corruption,face similar shortages of qualified 
personnel or technical expertise.17 
 
Further, a considerable number of cases are either closed or referred for further 
investigations due to insufficient evidence to support prosecutions, often caused by poor 
                                                          
11 Human Rights Watch (2013) 9.  
12 Human Rights Watch (2013) 9. 
13 See Human Rights Watch (2013) 8. 
14 Prosecutor in Anti-Corruption Court, 21 May 2013, cited in Human Rights Watch (2013) 1.  
15 Retired Justice John Bosco Katutsi, cited in Human Rights Watch (2013) 1.  
16 See ‘The Anti-Corruption Division’ available at www.judicature.go.ug. 
17 Inspectorate of Government (2012) 79. 
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investigating skills and capacities.18 Statistics show that in 2011, out of a total of 141 cases 
completed at the Anti-Corruption Court, there were 44 convictions (31.2%), 43 dismissals 
(30.5%), 24 nolleprosequi decisions (17%), 15 acquittals (10.6%), 10 withdrawals (7.1%),  and 
5 other matters(3.6%).19  The Anti-Corruption court may issue orders for confiscation of 
property after a conviction but this is not mandatory under the law and often not the focus 
of prosecutors. 
The office of the Inspectorate of Government (IG) operates the Asset Recovery Account, an 
administrative forfeiture account into which confiscated funds are placed.20 In the period 
2008 to 2011, a total of Ushs 859 926 768 ($343 970) was remitted to the Asset Recovery 
Account. In 2011 alone, Ushs 13 107 226 597 ($5 242 890) were saved as a result of 
investigations.21 However, forfeiture in these cases is done administratively, without the 
force of law, which significantly limits the capacity of the IG to recover stolen funds. The 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda was amended in 200522 to provide for the 
establishment of the Leadership Code Tribunal, but to date the Tribunal has not been 
constituted.The Inspector General of Government cannot enforce the confiscation of 
corruptly acquired assets in the absence of the Leadership Code Tribunal.23 
The above-mentioned incidents of corruption, coupled with the failure to charge, prosecute 
or convict senior public officials who are involved in corrupt practices,have profound effects 
on the country. First, the high level of corruption means that the country loses its much 
needed resources to such public officials. Second, such public officials are left to enjoy 
illicitly acquired wealth, at the expense of the country’s economic and social development. 
                                                          
18 Inspectorate of Government (2012) 79. 
19 Inspectorate of Government (2012) 78. 
20 Inspectorate of Government (2012) 80. 
21 Inspectorate of Government (2012) 80. 
22 The Constitution (Amendment  Act) 2005.  
23  See NestarMichumbi v IGG &AnorHCT-00-CV-CA-0062-2009. 
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The prevailing situation demonstrates the need for legal reform to allow for recovery of 
corruptly acquired assets in instances where it is not possible to prosecute or convict 
corrupt public officials.  
1.2  Legal Framework for Corruption Offences and Forfeiture of Corruptly Acquired 
Assets 
 
Uganda has developed a robust and comprehensive legal framework for the purposes of 
combating corruption and recovering stolen assets. Criminal liability for corrupt practices in 
both the private and public sphere is provided for by the Anti-Corruption Act of 2009.The 
Anti-Corruption Act criminalises various acts, including embezzlement, causing financial loss, 
abuse of office, fraud, bribery, influence peddling and nepotism.It allows for forfeiture or 
permanent deprivation of corrupt proceeds by order of court24 after a conviction,25 or 
where a person charged with an offence has died or absconds.26 
Furthermore, the Code of Conduct and Ethics for the Uganda Public Serviceof 2005 and the 
Leadership Code Act of 2002 regulate certain conduct, such as conflict of interest27 and 
receiving gifts. The Leadership Code Act requires public servants to declare their assets 
every two years.28 The Inspectorate of Government is responsible for the implementation of 
the Leadership Code29 and has powers to require confiscation of property after it is found 
that a leader has breached the Code.30 
                                                          
24 Section 2 of the Anti-Corruption Act of 2009. 
25 Section 63 of the Anti-Corruption Act of 2009. 
26 Section 65 of the Anti-Corruption Act of 2009.  
27 Section 27 of the Leadership Code Act of 2002. 
28 Section 4 of the Leadership Code Act of 2002. 
29 Section 3 of the Leadership Code Act of 2002. 
30 Section 21 of the Leadership Code Act of 2002. 
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The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2013 criminalises the laundering of proceeds of crime, 
including corruption, and provides for measures to prevent money laundering.31 It provides 
for seizure and freezing of laundered assets, and outlines procedures for obtaining 
restraining and confiscation orders.32 
In practice, confiscation of assets under Uganda’s current anti-corruption legal regime 
occurs only after conviction, at the discretion of the Court. As already demonstrated, 
criminal forfeiture is inadequate to deal with the recovery of stolen assets. In response to 
this problem, proposals for the amendment of the Anti-Corruption Act have been 
introduced by a member of parliament through a private member’s bill.33 The objectives of 
the bill, inter alia, are to provide for the amendment of the Anti-Corruption Act to allow for 
the mandatory confiscation of property of persons convicted of corruption offences and to 
ensure recovery of public funds lost as a result of the criminal acts, without the state having 
to secure a conviction first.34 The government of Uganda also seeks to enact a related piece 
of legislation, namely, the Proceeds of Corruption Assets Recovery Bill of 2013, for the 
purposes of recovery of stolen assets, but this effort appears to be in its early stages and the 
Bill is not available to the public. 
1.3  Modes of Asset Forfeiture 
 
In order to assess fully the gaps in Uganda’s laws on asset recovery, one needs to 
understand the nature of asset forfeiture in general. Corrupt proceeds may be confiscated 
via different routes, including civil action, criminal forfeiture, administrative forfeiture and 
civil forfeiture. 
                                                          
31 Part II and III of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2013. 
32 Part V of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2013. 
33 See the Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Bill, 2013. 
34 Preamble to and section 7 of the Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Bill, 2013. 
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1.3.1  Civil Proceedings in personam 
 
An affected state may institute civil proceedings against a defendant in order to recover 
corrupt proceeds. This method is useful where a conviction may be hard to obtain due to 
lack of evidence or other reasons. The standard of proof is lower (proof on a balance of 
probabilities) and proceedings can go ahead even in the absence of the defendant, as long 
as he was served properly. In the case of foreign assets, proceedings will be instituted in the 
jurisdiction where the assets are hidden.35 
1.3.2  Administrative Forfeiture 
 
This occurs in circumstances where there is no need for judicial intervention. It happens in 
cases where the seizure, freezing or confiscation is not contested. In some jurisdictions, 
administrative forfeiture is subject to confirmation by court.36 
1.3.3 Criminal Forfeiture 
 
Criminal forfeiture involves an order in personam, against the person. Criminal proceedings 
are brought against an accused person, during which it must be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt that he committed the corruption offence. Once the offender is convicted of the 
crime, tainted property which constitutes the proceeds will be confiscated as part of the 
sentence. The standard of proof for confiscation may be lower (proof on a balance of 
probabilities)or may be the same as that required for a conviction. Criminal forfeiture 
systems can be either object-based,whereby stolen property is confiscated, or value-based 
in which case the value of the benefit derived from the stolen property is quantified.37The 
                                                          
35 Council of Europe ‘Impact Study on Civil Forfeiture’ CoE (2013) 12. 
36 Brunet al (2011) 107. 
37 Greenberg et a l(2009) 13. 
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offender will be required then to pay the value of the benefit to the victim or the 
government. 
1.3.4  Civil Forfeiture in rem 
 
Civil forfeiture, which is the subject of this study, is also referred to as non-conviction based 
asset forfeiture. It is an action in rem, against the thing or property which is suspected to be 
the proceeds or instrumentalityof corruption and not against the offender. This method of 
confiscationdoes not require a criminal conviction in order for corrupt proceeds to be 
attached. Proceedings which are civil in nature are brought against the property itself. Civil 
forfeiture proceedings are different from any criminal proceedings that may be instituted 
against the offender. The prosecutor has the burden to prove,on a balance of 
probabilities,that the underlying offence was committed and also that the property was 
involved in illegal activity.38 
1.4  Historical Development of Civil Forfeiture 
 
The concept of civil forfeiture has roots in feudal England where subjects who committed 
treason had to forfeit their lives and interest in their land and chattels. Forfeiture was also 
an important concept in admiralty law where in rem orders were passed against ships.39 
In the United States of America, civil forfeiture laws were enacted first in the 
seventeenthcentury for smuggling and subsequently piracy and slave trafficking cases.  In 
cases where the owner of the property could not be found or was in another jurisdiction, 
cargo and ships were forfeited.   The 1970s and 1980s saw the enactment of laws, one of 
them being the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which led to the widespread use 
                                                          
38 Greenberg et al (2009) 14. 
39 Young (2009) 15. 
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of civil forfeiture in the United States. Subsequently, another law, the Civil Asset Forfeiture 
Reform Act was passed in 2000.40 
Civil forfeiture has spread steadily to other jurisdictions, mainly those in the common law 
system, including the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, South Africa and Canada, where it 
has been used to address corruption, organised crime and other social evils.41 
1.5  Differences between Civil Forfeiture and Criminal Forfeiture 
 
Criminal forfeiture and civil forfeiture usually exist together in a legal system and 
complement each other. In fact, civil forfeiture should be viewed as an alternative when 
criminal forfeiture is not possible or feasible. 
One of the main differences between civil forfeiture and criminal forfeiture is that, in the 
former, proceedings are brought against the property and the owner is only a third party to 
the proceedings, while in the latter, proceedings are against the accused person.  Further, 
criminal forfeiture requires a criminal trial and conviction before it can be imposed.42 The 
prosecutor must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused person was involved in a 
criminal act whereby he acquired the assets wrongly. In the case of civil forfeiture, 
conviction is not a requirement. However, unlawful conduct must be proved on a balance of 
probabilities. There is also a requirement of proof that the property is tainted. Criminal 
forfeiture may be imposed also as part of a sentence, while proceedings for civil forfeiture 
maybe instituted before, during or after a criminal conviction or even where there is no 
                                                          
40 Cassella(2009) 24. 
41 Young (2009) 17. 
42 Greenberg et al (2009) 13-14. 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
conviction. Criminal forfeiture is object-based or value-based whereas civil forfeiture is 
mainly object-based.43 
Civil forfeiture is useful in the following circumstances: 
In cases of flight and disappearance of an accused person, as a result of which a criminal 
trial cannot proceed and conviction cannot be obtained against him; 
Where the accused person dies before criminal proceedings against him can commence or 
be concluded; 
Following an acquittal of the accused person because the state has failed to prove his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt; 
Where there is insufficient evidence to found a conviction against an accused person; 
Where domestic immunity is a bar to criminal proceedings; 
Where the accused person is a powerful politician or public official and prosecution against 
him is not feasible.44 
1.6  Civil Forfeiture and Recovery of Corruptly Acquired Assets 
 
Over the last three decades, there has been a policy shift, at both national and international 
level, from the tradition of imposing only prison terms or fines to depriving criminals of the 
spoils acquired from their criminal acts. Individuals who engage in offences such as drug 
trafficking and economic crime do so primarily for monetary gain. Law enforcement 
authorities realised that many of those involved in such crimes were able still to enjoy 
                                                          
43 Greenberg et al (2009) 13-14. 
44 Greenberg et al 14-15 and Council of Europe (2013) 17-18. 
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theirloot after serving imprisonment. Confiscation was seen as a way of depriving them of 
these benefits. In matters relating to corruption, civil forfeiture has been used to recover 
assets stolen by corrupt officials in developing countries, where it would not have been 
possible under the traditional criminal justice system. Civil forfeiture cases were used 
successfully in countries such as Nigeria and the Philippines, whose leaders stole billions of 
dollars and stashed them away in foreign jurisdictions but who were not available to stand 
trial.45 
Civil forfeiture does not take away the responsibility of the state to prosecute an accused 
person involved in corruption or to impose other punishments such as fines or 
imprisonment.  Instead, it aims to ensure that much needed funds which were 
acquiredillicitly by criminals do not benefit them but are recovered andused to help the 
people who need them the most. Forfeiture also aims to prevent illicit funds from being 
integrated into the legitimate financial system, to help compensate victims and to 
undermine the operations of organised criminal gangs. It helps to destroy the perception 
that crime does pay.46 
Developing countries, like Uganda, face numerous obstacles in trying to recover stolen 
assets.  Financial constraintsand poorly resourced and poorly skilled legal, judicial and 
investigative departments hinder the prosecution of economic criminals and the recovery of 
assets. Sometimes public officials are too powerful or influential to be prosecuted. 
It has been noted that asset recovery and confiscation systems are most effective when 
they provide for all forms of forfeiture.  Failure to prosecute corrupt officials means that 
many of them retain and enjoy corruptly acquired assets without punishment. Uganda 
                                                          
45 United Nations General  Assembly (2006) 10. 
46 Greenberg et al (2009) 13. 
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needs a law on civil forfeiture to facilitate recovery of assets where prosecutions are not 
possible or viable. Such a law should not substitute prosecution, but should complement 
existing confiscation laws in the country to ensure effective recovery of corruptly acquired 
assets. 
Further, since corruption is a transnational offence, it is important for a country to be able 
to request enforcement of freezing and confiscation orders and, in turn, to be able to 
enforce the same.47 
1.7  Asset Recovery Processes 
1.7.1    Investigation 
 
The first step in asset recovery involves gathering evidence about where the proceeds of 
corruption might be located. Investigations may be carried out by law enforcement officers, 
working hand in hand with prosecutors and investigators. When needing to carry out 
investigations in foreign jurisdictions, a country can seek help through mutual legal 
assistance requests.48 
1.7.2     Seizure and Freezing 
 
When assets have been traced, and are considered to be subject to confiscation, provisional 
measures must be taken to secure such assets. They may be preserved using restraint, 
freezing or seizure orders pending further investigations or court proceedings. This is 
necessary to prevent the dissipation or transfer of such assets.49 
                                                          
47 Council of Europe (2013) 11. 
48 Brunet al (2011) 5. 
49 Brunet al (2011) 6. 
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1.7.3    Proceedings in Court 
 
The next step in the process of asset recovery is the institution of court proceedings. These 
may be criminal trial and forfeiture proceedings, civil forfeiture proceedings, or private civil 
actions.  These proceedings aim for the award of confiscation orders, orders for 
compensation or fines.The orders arising from such awards then must be enforced. In 
foreign jurisdictions, orders may be enforced directly where a country enforces a foreign 
order issued by another state. Orders may be enforced indirectly also where a country 
opens its own case upon request from another country, obtains an order and then enforces 
it.50 
1.7.4  Return of Assets 
 
Pursuant to the award of confiscation orders in court, assets that have been confiscated 
must be transferred to a government fund or trust. Where assets are in a foreign 
jurisdiction, they will vest in a national confiscation fund.51An affected state will have to 
request another state to return assets to their former owners in other jurisdictions.52 
1.7.5     International Co-operation 
 
Where assets have been transferred to a foreign jurisdiction, it is essential to use 
international co-operation to carry out investigations, and issue or enforce freezing, 
seizureand confiscation orders. International co-operation can be sought through mutual 
legal assistance.53 
                                                          
50 Brunet al (2011) 7. 
51 Brunet al (2011) 7. 
52 Brunet al (2011) 8. 
53 Brunet al (2011)6. 
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1.8  Literature Review 
 
Civil asset recovery is a relatively new area in most jurisdictions. Hence publications in this 
area, although they are emerging, are still scanty. There is currently no scholarly literature 
on civil asset forfeiture laws in Uganda. The study draws on literature from other 
jurisdictions on this subject. 
In the book Civil Forfeiture of Criminal Property: Legal Measures for Targeting the Proceeds 
of Crime,54  the authors detail perspectives and experiences of civil forfeiture laws in 
different jurisdictions such as the United States, Ireland, South Africa, Canada and United 
Kingdom. Simser, one of the authors, also offers an introductory article on what civil 
forfeiture entails. The experiences and best practices from other jurisdictions with civil 
forfeiture regimes are an important guide for building civil asset forfeiture legal regimes.  
Wahn addresses the pitfalls of civil asset forfeiture laws.55 He argues that civil asset 
forfeiture is generally a violation of the presumption of innocence. He explains that one of 
the pitfalls of such laws is that they can be politicised and used against those who criticise 
the government.  
In the book Emerging Trends in Asset Recovery,56the authors address current developments 
in asset recovery for corruption related offences, including the misuse of political 
immunities, mutual legal assistance, international co-operation, piercing the veil of shell 
companies and hurdles in fighting corrupt acts. The authors also examine case studies such 
as Equatorial Guinea, Costa Rica, Kenya and the Arab Revolution.   Additionally, the book is a 
                                                          
54 Young (2009). 
55 Wahn (2014). 
56 Zinkernagelet al (2013). 
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guide to the challenges to asset recovery and offers ideas on reform, the role of financial 
institution laws, and lessons learned from past experiences.  
Vlasic & Cooper57  have noted that asset recovery is one of the most important means of 
fighting corruption and strengthening the rule of law, especially in developing countries. 
They assert that the process of asset recovery usually is filled with many legal challenges, 
including lack of legal precedents and political interference.  They also allude to the fact that 
to enforce recovery of assets, there is often  a requirement of a criminal conviction, which 
can be difficult if the perpetrator or accused person is dead, is in exile or if the conviction 
would result in instability. The focus of the article, however, is the Duvalier case of Haiti and 
what lessons can be learnt from it, particularly for countries that were involved in the Arab 
Spring. The article argues for the ratification of United Nations Convention against 
Corruption and the creation of legal tools for co-operation in asset recovery cases at 
international level, but mentions little about asset recovery mechanisms at the domestic 
level. 
Civil Forfeiture: A Higher Form of Commercial Law, an article by Schwarz & Rothman, 
explains the historical development of civil forfeiture through an analysis of case and 
statutory law within America and how its application has affected financial institutions. 
Although the article deals specifically with the potential legal constraints of civil forfeiture 
and its usurpation of commercial and bankruptcy law principles, it has important lessons for 
asset forfeiture in corruption related offences. 
As already noted, the articles and books cited above are an important source of information 
for developing comprehensive legal regimes on asset recovery. The significance of this 
                                                          
58 Vlasic & Cooper (2011) 18. 
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research lies in the fact that there is currently no scholarly work on Uganda relating to the 
area of civil asset forfeiture for corruption offences. There are proposals in the pipeline to 
amend the existing laws on Uganda’s statute books to provide for non-conviction based 
asset forfeiture. However, these processes are still in their infancy. This study is thus timely 
and relevant for purposes of advocacy and information.  It may serve as a guide and inform 
legal, policy and institutional reforms in Uganda. 
1.9  Research Questions 
 
The research questions are: What mechanisms are provided for in Uganda’s law for the 
recovery of corruptly acquired assets? What are the loopholes in the current legislation? 
What is the way forward concerning Uganda’s legal regime on recovery of corruptly 
acquired assets? Can civil forfeiture address some of the current loopholes? 
1.10  Outline of Remaining Chapters 
 
Chapter Two 
This chapter analyses the international legal instruments on civil forfeiture. The discussion is 
restricted to instruments to which Uganda is a party. 
Chapter Three 
This chapter identifies and discusses the existing loopholes in the Ugandan domestic legal 
framework on criminal, administrative and civil forfeiture. 
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Chapter Four 
This chapter addresses the basic elements of civil forfeiture that Uganda should consider in 
enacting legislation on civil forfeiture. 
Chapter Five 
This chapter contains recommendations and the conclusion.
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CHAPTER TWO 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON CIVIL FORFEITURE IN RELATION TO UGANDA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the international and regional anti-corruption legal instruments to 
which Uganda is party, with a focus on confiscation and on civil forfeiture. It discusses 
Uganda’s obligations and rights in relation to the recovery of corruptly acquired assets. It 
also highlights the significance of civil forfeiture at the international level and potential 
challengesfaced in implementing the Conventions. 
The concept of confiscation of proceeds of crime is a relatively new one in international law. 
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
PsychotropicSubstances (Vienna Convention) of 1988 was the first international instrument 
to provide for confiscation of all proceeds or property equivalent to the proceeds derived 
from drug-related offences.1 The United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime (Palermo Convention) of 2000 later adapted this concept to a wider range 
of offences by requiring states parties to establish measures under domestic law to enable 
confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities of crimes under the Convention.2 
Confiscation is even more recent in the field of international anti-corruption law. The United 
Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) of 2003 and the African Union Convention 
                                                          
1 Article 5 of the Vienna Convention. 
2 Article 12 of the Palermo Convention. 
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on Preventing and Combating Corruption and other regional instruments3 all contain 
provisions on confiscation of proceeds or instrumentalities of corruption offences. 
Most international anti-corruption instruments do not prescribe civil forfeiture and, on the 
whole, have tended to leave it to states parties to decide which system of confiscation to 
employ. With the advent of UNCAC, however, states parties are required to consider 
enacting legal measures to enable courts and other competent authorities to enforce orders 
not only for criminal forfeiture but also for civil forfeiture. By doing so, UNCAC highlights the 
importance of civil forfeiture in ensuring that criminals do not enjoy proceeds acquired 
through corruption and in complementing existing systems in criminal forfeiture. 
Most countries still have a tradition of confiscation of proceeds arising out of a criminal 
prosecution. Uganda is one such country which provides for confiscation of corrupt 
proceeds by way of a conviction. However, the practice of civil forfeiture or non-conviction 
based asset forfeiture, which has existed for decades in jurisdictions such as the United 
States of America and Italy,4 is picking up steadily and several jurisdictions have adopted it5 
as a mechanism against economic crime and drug-related offences. 
2.2 United Nations Convention against Corruption 
 
 The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which came into force in 
2005,6 is the first international anti-corruption instrument to contain comprehensive legal 
provisions on asset recovery. Indeed, asset recovery is one of the fundamental principles on 
                                                          
3 See, for instance, article 3(3) of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions of 1997; article 15 of the Inter-American Convention against 
Corruption of 1996; and article 19(3) of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 
of 1999. 
4 Council of Europe ‘Impact Study on Civil Forfeiture’ CoE 2013. 
5 Council of Europe 2013. 
6 Uganda ratified UNCAC on 9 September 2004. 
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which the Convention stands.7 Before the enactment of UNCAC, developing countries were 
faced with several issues regarding the recovery of assets stolen by corrupt officials and 
stashed away in other jurisdictions.8 Corrupt officials were taking advantage of loopholes to 
transfer assets and enjoy corrupt proceeds in other jurisdictions.9 One of the main issues 
was that states from which assets were being taken often wanted to confiscate and 
repatriate assets but did not have sufficient proof of the illicit origin of such assets, which 
proof the requested states always demanded before they would co-operate with the 
requesting state.10 Also, there were insufficient mechanisms to enable states to repatriate 
assets once they had been identified and seized. This often meant that criminals were able 
to enjoy the benefits of their criminal activity. UNCAC was a breakthrough in this area. 
Chapter V of UNCAC contains provisions for the identification, tracing, freezing, confiscation 
and repatriation of proceeds and instrumentalities of corruptly acquired assets. The Chapter 
also outlines provisions on mutual legal assistance and international co-operation. Article 51 
points out that asset recovery is one of the pillars of the Convention and requires states 
parties to co-operate with one another to facilitate recovery of assets. The fact that there 
were intense negotiations and workshops on asset recovery during the discussions leading 
to UNCAClends support to the importance of asset recovery in the fight against 
corruption.11  Those negotiations established asset recovery as a fundamental principle of 
the Convention in the fight against corruption.12 
 
 
                                                          
7 See article 51 of UNCAC. 
8 Claman (2008) 335. 
9 Claman (2008) 335. 
10 Claman (2008) 335. 
11 Webb (2012) 206-212. See also Claman (2008) 336. 
12 Article 51 of UNCAC. 
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2.2.1  Asset Recovery under UNCAC 
Confiscation is defined under the Convention as the permanent deprivation of property by 
order of a court or other competent authority.13 This connotes both conviction and non-
conviction based forfeiture. 
Article 52 provides for measures aimed at detection of proceeds of crime stashed away in 
financial institutions by politically exposed persons (PEPs) or holders of high value accounts. 
States parties must require these institutions to verify customer identities and beneficial 
ownership information, and implement enhanced due diligence for PEPs.  Arguably, these 
measures indirectly promote civil forfeiture because they provide readily available evidence 
of corrupt offences.14 
 Article 53 covers direct recovery of property through civil action and forfeiture where 
mutual legal assistance may not be possible or effective enough. States parties are required 
to implement measures to enable other states parties to lodge civil actions in their domestic 
courts,15 including civil proceedings against an accused personand civil 
forfeitureproceedings, in order to establish true ownership of or title to the property. Other 
measures are aimed at permitting courts to order compensation to parties harmed.16 States 
parties, therefore, can institute claims as private litigants and victims seeking restitution or 
compensation. 
Article 54 requires states parties, pursuant to Article 55(2), to provide measures in domestic 
law to enable its competent authorities to give effect to a foreign freezing or seizure order 
                                                          
13 Article 2 of UNCAC. 
14 See Goredema   (2009). 
15 Article 53(a) of UNCAC. 
16 Article 53(b) of UNCAC. 
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or permit its domestic authorities to issue a freezing or seizure order requested by the 
authorities of a requesting state party.17 The order above must provide reasonable proof 
that such property eventually will be subject to confiscation under paragraph 54(1) of the 
Convention. States parties are required also to consider taking additional measures to 
preserve property which had been confiscated on the basis of a foreign arrest warrant or 
criminal charge.18 
 Article 54 provides also for mutual legal assistance in recovery of stolen assets by 
confiscation. The requested state party may enforce a court order for confiscation issued by 
a requesting party 19 or it may permit its own domestic authorities to confiscate illicit 
property which may be of foreign origin upon adjudication of offences.20 This article is 
meant to provide mutual legal assistance pursuant to requests under article 55 of the 
Convention. States are required to provide for both direct and indirect enforcement within 
their domestic legislation. This is meant to cover loopholes in mutual legal assistance where 
previously states could give effect to requests for mutual legal assistance only through 
executing foreign orders or instituting their own proceedings. This created potential 
loopholes, where some requests could not be effected because there was no mechanism to 
enforce them under the domestic legal framework.21   The Convention envisages, in article 
54(1)(a) & (b), confiscation arising out of a criminal conviction.  
Civil forfeiture, which is the subject of article 54(1)(c), is not mandatory under the 
Convention.   The provision requires states parties to consider putting in place measures to 
allow for non-conviction based forfeiture in case of death, flight or disappearance of an 
                                                          
17 Article 54(2)(a) & (b) of UNCAC. 
18 Article 54(2)(c) of UNCAC. 
19 Article 54(1)(a) of UNCAC. 
20 Article 54(1)(b) of UNCAC. 
21 Claman (2008) 335. 
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offender. Implementation of this provision requires a state party to enact legislation to 
provide specifically for civil forfeiture. That provisions on non-conviction based forfeiture 
are hortatory is perhaps one of the most significant shortcomings of the Convention. It 
possibly could impede the effectiveness or implementation of the provisions under articles 
52, 53 and 54 that provide for civil forfeiture. It also fails to take into account the fact that in 
many jurisdictions, corrupt officials are in control of state organs and prosecution against 
them usually is not possible until they leave office or flee.   
Article 55 addresses international co-operation.  The article requires a state party that 
receives an order from a fellow state party for confiscation of proceeds of crime to enforce 
it directly through its own authorities.22  Alternatively, a state party which receives a 
confiscation request must enforce it indirectly by obtaining a confiscation order through its 
domestic authorities and then give effect to it.23  Upon request, a state party is required to 
take steps to identify, trace and freeze or seize proceeds of crime for the purpose of 
eventual confiscation by the requesting state party.24 
Article 55 also contains provisions on what should be included in a request for mutual legal 
assistance to recover assets, including details such as the description, location and 
estimated value of the property that is sought to be confiscated. It further requires states 
parties to give information about the execution of the order and measures taken to give 
adequate notification to bona fide third parties. Decisions taken under article 55(1) & (2) are 
subject to the domestic law and procedural rules of the requested state party, and also to 
bilateral or multilateral agreements to which the requested state may be party.25States 
                                                          
22 Article 55(1)(b) of UNCAC. 
23 Article 55(1)(a) of UNCAC. 
24 Article 55(2) of UNCAC. 
25 Article 55(4) of UNCAC. 
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parties may refuse to give co-operation where a requesting state party gives untimely or 
insufficient evidence, or where the property sought to be confiscated is of de minimis 
value.26 
 Article 57 addresses the return and disposal of confiscated assets. Public funds that were 
embezzled must be returned to the requesting state party upon request.27 Proceeds arising 
from other offences will be returned upon the requesting party furnishing proof of prior 
ownership of such property.28 In other cases, the requested state party will give 
consideration to returning confiscated property to the requesting state party, to prior 
legitimate owners or to compensating victims.29 
2.2.2 Challenges and Prospects 
 
UNCAC has been lauded by many scholars and practitioners for including provisions for non-
conviction based confiscation, which is a reflection of the current trends seeing more 
jurisdictions adopting civil forfeiture. It has been argued also that this is an acknowledgment 
of the significance of non-conviction based asset forfeiture.30 However, leaving civil 
forfeiture to the discretion of states parties limits the effectiveness of efforts to recover 
assets, in that mutual legal assistance requests need not be effected by states parties which 
have not enacted the relevant provisions. Claman, for instance, points out that failure to 
require states parties to adopt non-conviction based asset forfeiture limits its impact and 
reach.31 He argues that it has been discovered that states parties are able to handle better 
                                                          
26 Article 55(7) of UNCAC. 
27 Article 57(3)(a) of UNCAC. 
28 Article 57(3)(b) of UNCAC. 
29 Article 57(3)(c) of UNCAC. 
30 Claman (2008) 335. 
31 Claman (2008) 335. 
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challenges of flight, immunity and death if they have non-conviction based forfeiture in their 
domestic legal regimes. 
Differences between approaches taken in civil and common law systems, especially 
concerning jurisdiction, confiscation proceedings and admission of evidence, also pose 
challenges. Requesting states parties that seek to recover assets often face obstacles in 
developed countries in the form of high evidentiary and procedural requirements.32 
Additionally, most jurisdictions recognise only requests for confiscation arising out of a 
criminal conviction. This is a serious challenge, given that usually corrupt officials take 
advantage of immunities or may escape.33 
Asset recovery is also very costly. Developing countries, such as Uganda, are faced often 
with the problem of insufficient resources to trace, freeze and confiscate assets 
domestically and also at the international level. Prosecuting the predicate offence, 
identifying and tracing, freezing or seizing and confiscating assets require significant 
financial resources and expertise.34 
Experts and practitioners in the field point out that confiscation is often the most 
challenging phase of the asset recovery process because of the requirement to prove a 
nexus between the corruption offences and the corrupt proceeds.   Other obstacles include 
inadequate legal frameworks to enable enforcement of confiscation orders.35 
However, the enactment of UNCAC led to the development of several initiatives aimed at 
building the capacity of practitioners and giving technical assistance to prosecutors and 
                                                          
32 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) A/61/177 (2006). 
33 UNGA (2006). 
34 Vlassis, Gottwald & Park (2013) 168. 
35 Vlassis, Gottwald & Park (2013) 168. 
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lawyers in the developing world on matters of confiscation and recovery of corrupt 
proceeds. The Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Asset Recovery, the 
Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR), and the International Centre for Asset Recovery 
(ICAR) all have been involved in publishing materials36 on confiscation and civil forfeiture in 
particular, and also training practitioners at both the international and domestic levels. This 
has led to a significant increase in awareness of and enhanced knowledge about 
confiscation among practitioners.37 
2.3 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
 
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo 
Convention)38 places emphasis on the criminalisation of corruption, money laundering and 
organised crime, and on the prevention of these offences.  The Convention also contains 
provisions on the confiscation of proceeds derived from the above-mentioned offences.  
Similar to UNCAC, the definition of confiscation under the Palermo Convention is broad and 
includes orders for confiscation issued by a court or other competent authority.39 
Article 12 covers confiscation of criminal proceeds and requires states parties to include 
measures in their domestic legislation that enable forfeiture of proceeds and 
instrumentalities of offences under the Convention.40  It requires states parties to adopt 
measures to enable identification, tracing and freezing or seizure as preludes to 
confiscation. This provision also targets proceeds of crime that have been transformed into 
                                                          
36 Such as ‘The Good Practices Guide on Non-Conviction Based Forfeiture’ (StAR). 
37 Vlassis, Gottwald & Park (2013) 164. 
38 The Palermo Convention was adopted on 15 November 2000. Uganda ratified the Convention on 9 
March 2005. 
39 Article 2 of the Palermo Convention. 
40 Article 12(1) of the Palermo Convention. 
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other forms property,41 those that have been intermingled with legitimate property,42 and 
income derived from proceeds of crime.43  States parties are required also to enable courts 
and other competent authorities to order the confiscation of bank, financial or commercial 
records. 44 The rights of third parties in relation to claims to property are protected.45 
One of the shortcomings of article 12 of the Palermo Convention is that its implementation 
is subject to the domestic law of states parties, which condition may hinder immediate 
enforcement due to differences in legal systems and bureaucratic procedures. As 
practitioners point out, one of the essential hallmarks of seizure and freezing procedures for 
stolen assets is that they should be amenable to implementation almost immediately after 
discovery.46 
Article 13 addresses international co-operation for the purposes of civil forfeiture. States 
parties are required to give effect to the requests of other states parties for confiscation 
through indirect47 or direct enforcement.48 Upon receiving such a request, the requested 
state party is required to identify, search for, trace and freeze proceeds and 
instrumentalities of the offence. Article 13 is subject also to domestic law and bilateral 
agreements and treaties that may bind the requested and requesting states. The application 
of article 13 is limited further by a requirement of dual criminality being met before a 
request can be enforced.49 
                                                          
41 Article 12(3) of the Palermo Convention. 
42 Article 12(4) of the Palermo Convention. 
43 Article 12(5) of the Palermo Convention. 
44 Article 12(6) of the Palermo Convention. 
45 Article 12(8) of the Palermo Convention. 
46 Pieth (2008) 11. 
47 Article 13(1)(a) of the Palermo Convention. 
48 Article 13(1)(b) of the Palermo Convention. 
49 Article 13(7) of the Palermo Convention. 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
The procedures for repatriation of proceeds of crime that have been confiscated are 
outlined in article 14 of the Convention. Property and proceeds of crime which have been 
forfeited are to be returned, upon request, to the requesting state to facilitate the 
compensation of victims or the return of the property to its legitimate owners.50 
2.4 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
 
The AU Convention places its emphasis on criminalisation and prevention of corruption.  
However, it provides also for confiscation of corrupt proceeds derived from offences 
created in the Convention. Confiscation is defined  to mean “any penalty or measure 
resulting in the final deprivation of property, proceeds or instrumentalities ordered by a 
court of law following proceedings relating to a criminal offence or offences connected with 
or related to corruption”. 51 
The definition and scope of confiscation in the AU Convention is more restricted than in 
UNCAC and the Palermo Convention. In the AU Convention, confiscation orders can be 
issued only by a court of law and proceedings relating to confiscation must arise out of a 
criminal charge or criminal proceedings. In effect, confiscation orders issued by non-judicial 
bodies, such as prosecutorial bodies and anti-corruption agencies, are not enforceable 
under the Convention. 
According to article 16 of the AU Convention, states parties are required to adopt legislative 
measures to enable competent authorities to identify, trace and seize proceeds and 
instrumentalities pending a final judgment.52  States parties are required also to implement 
legislative measures to facilitate confiscation of proceeds and property acquired through 
                                                          
50 Article 14(2) of the Palermo Convention. 
51 Article 1 of the AU Convention. 
52 Article 16(1)(a) of the AU Convention. 
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offences under the Convention and to facilitate the repatriation of such proceeds and 
property.53  Article 16(2) states that any proceeds or property that a state party requests 
another state party to seize either should be required as evidence or should be the result of 
an offence for which extradition is sought under the Convention.   Assets can be handed 
over to the requesting state upon request, even where extradition is not possible due to 
flight, disappearance or death.54 
Co-operation and mutual legal assistance are provided for in article 18 of the Convention. 
The article requires requested states parties to provide the greatest possible assistance and 
co-operation to competent and recognised authorities of a requesting state in anti-
corruption proceedings.55 
Article 19 covers international co-operation. Countries are to adopt legislative measures 
that allow for freezing of foreign accounts and repatriation of corrupt proceeds and 
property to the country of origin. The AU Convention does not provide expressly for non-
conviction based confiscation. However, it can be inferred from the definition of 
confiscation which refers to orders arising from proceedings related to a criminal offence.  
2.5 Revised Draft East African Community Protocol on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption 
 
The Revised Draft East African Community Protocol on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption (EAC Protocol) has been proposed by partner states of the East African 
Community in an effort to combat the rampant practice of corruption in the region, but is 
                                                          
53 Article 16(1)(b) & (c) of the AU Convention. 
54 Article 16(3) of the AU Convention. 
55 Article 18 of the AU Convention. 
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yet to be signed by member states.56 Article 1 defines confiscation to include forfeiture or 
permanent deprivation of property by order of court or any other competent authority. 
Parties are required to adopt measures within their domestic legal framework to ensure 
confiscation of proceeds or instrumentalities derived from offences under the EAC 
Protocol.57  A notable challenge is the limited range of offences established under the 
Protocol. It criminalises only bribery, illicit enrichment, embezzlement, trading in influence 
as well as fraudulent use or concealment of property derived from any of these acts. Such a 
small number of offences is likely to limit the reach of confiscation measures. 
Legal measures adopted by member states must enable competent authorities to identify, 
trace and freeze proceeds and property derived from corruption, as temporary measures 
leading to eventual confiscation. 58 Partner states are required to afford one another 
thebroadest assistance possiblein asset recovery, from identification through confiscation to 
transfer of proceeds of crime.59Under the EAC Protocol, partner states cannot invoke bank 
secrecy laws as a reason for failure to co-operate. The Protocol also envisages the 
establishment of financial intelligence units within partner states to assist in the recovery of 
proceeds of crime.60 
The enforcement of these measures among partner states is subject to domestic law and 
international treaties, which condition is likely to impede the implementation of the EAC 
Protocol. Already, one of the reasons that hasstalled the signing of the Protocol is the 
                                                          
56 See www.eac.int. 
57 Article 8(1)(a) of the EAC Protocol. 
58 Article 8(1)(b) of the  EAC Protocol. 
59 Article 8(4) of theEAC Protocol. 
60 Article 14 of the EAC Protocol. 
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difference in the domestic law of partner states.61 The Protocol requires that prosecutorial 
powers be given to competent authorities.62  “Competent authorities” have been 
interpreted to mean anti-corruption agencies. Differences in domestic law have seen Kenya 
vesting its prosecutorial powers in the Director of Public Prosecutions, while Uganda has 
vested prosecutorial powers in both the Director of Public Prosecutions and the 
Inspectorate of Government.63Such differences have delayed signing of the EAC Protocol, 
with some member states, like Kenya, requesting amendment of the provision on 
prosecutorial powers.64 
2.6      Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force 
 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), established in 1989, is a group of inter-governmental 
bodies from 39 member jurisdictions. The FATF has developed a peer review mechanism 
and soft law to help member states effectively implement frameworks of legislation, policy 
and regulation on money laundering and terrorist financing and proliferation.65 The FATF 
Recommendations of 201266 are recognised universally but are binding only on member 
countries. Uganda is not a member state of the FATF but recognises its principles for the 
purposes of guidance. 
Recommendation 4 requires countries to adopt legislative and other measures to empower 
authorities to search, trace and identify and freeze proceeds and instrumentalities used in 
money laundering and predicate offences such as corruption. Countries are advised also to 
                                                          
61 See The East African ‘Regional Agencies Seek More Powers to Fight Corruption’ 28 June 2014 
(accessed on 1 September 2014). 
62 Article 6(3) of the EAC Protocol. 
63 Article 120 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 as amended. 
64 The East African 28 June 2014. 
65 FATF ‘International Standards of Combating Money Laundering, The Financing of Terrorism and 
Proliferation’ FATF 2012. 
66 FATF 2012. 
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consider adopting measures that allow for non-conviction based confiscation, subject to 
domestic law. 
Recommendation 38 requires that countries should be able to respond to requests to 
identify, freeze and seize proceeds and instrumentalities which arise from non-conviction 
based proceedings if they are in accordance with the requested state party’s domestic law. 
The FATF Best Practices Paper67 notes that non-conviction based confiscation may be 
enforced through or outside criminal proceedings.68 Non-Conviction based forfeiture is 
recommended also in the Best Practices Paper in situations where there is insufficient 
evidence to found a conviction, where the offender has immunity from prosecution or 
where  there is failure to secure a conviction because of technical defects in the 
prosecution. 
2.7  The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
 
The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), in which Uganda 
participates, has urged states, based on the advice of the Expert Working Groups on UNCAC, 
to put in place legislative measures for civil forfeiture69 so as to make provision for non-
conviction based orders in relation to foreign jurisdictions and to support mutual legal 
assistance in such matters. The CHOGM also compiled draft legislation on civil forfeiture 
based on the recommendations of the Expert Working Groups. 
 
                                                          
67 FATF’Best Practices on Confiscation (Recommendations 4 and 38) and a Framework for Ongoing Work 
on Asset Recovery’. 
68 Paragraph 15, Best Practices Paper. 
69 See Aso Rock Declaration of 2003. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
 
Non-conviction based forfeiture is a relatively new concept in the field of international anti-
corruption law. Most of the international and regional anti-corruption instruments do not 
provide expressly for civil forfeiture or require it. This has slowed development of the 
concept of civil forfeiture in the fight against corruption. With the advent of United Nations 
Convention against Corruption, however, states parties have realised the importance of 
enacting provisions on civil forfeiture to counter the loopholes in criminal forfeiture.  
Further, Uganda, as a party to the international conventions above, is required to consider 
taking steps, including enacting legislation on civil forfeiture, to enable recovery of corruptly 
acquired assets at both domestic and international level.  While most jurisdictions still 
favour criminal confiscation, many member countries now are embracing civil forfeiture to 
address the challenges of confiscation. It is incumbent upon developing countries such as 
Uganda to embrace the concept of civil forfeiture to enhance the fight against corruption 
and enable confiscation of corrupt proceeds.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ANTI-CORRUPTION AND CIVIL FORFEITURE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN UGANDA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Uganda, as a party to international anti-corruption conventions such as UNCAC and the 
African Union Convention on the Preventing and Combating of Corruption, must keep in 
mind its obligations under the Act.Under Uganda’s current legal regime, corrupt proceeds 
may be confiscated after a conviction for an offence under the Anti-Corruption Act of 2009 
or Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2013. However, this is not mandatory and is at the 
discretion of the court.  Prosecutors focus on successfully prosecuting corrupt acts and 
securing custodial punishment for offenders, paying little attention to the issue of depriving 
culprits of corruptly acquired property.  What is more, insufficient evidence, flight, death, 
immunity and the fact that some public officials are too powerful hinder prosecution of a 
considerable number of cases.   
Assets may also be confiscated administratively by the Inspector General of Government 
with suspects returning stolen assets to avoid prosecution. However, cases instituted in 
relation to these modes of forfeiture are still few compared to the amount of resources lost 
to corruption.  Also, administrative confiscation of corruptly acquired assets is not backed by 
the force of law. 
At present, the Anti-Corruption Act providesfor civil forfeiture by implication, while the Anti-
Money Laundering Act makes but scanty provisions for it. Civil forfeiture in these two 
statutes is limited to cases of death or flight, only after a person has been charged. 
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The remainder of this chapter discusses in more detail the current anti-corruption legislation 
in Uganda as it relates to civil forfeiture and highlights the need for Uganda to introduce 
legislation on civil forfeiture and asset recovery as whole in order to complement the 
existing criminal and administrative confiscation systems. It also considers the current 
efforts, in the form of two bills, to introduce civil forfeiture. 
3.2 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 
 
Parliament is mandated by the Constitution to enact the Leadership Code of Conduct1 and 
to establish the Leadership Code Tribunal2 for which it is to prescribe composition, 
jurisdiction and function. Whereas the former has been enacted as the Leadership Code Act 
of 2002, the latter has not yet been established. This has hindered enforcement of the 
provisions on administrative confiscation as they can be enforced only after determination 
or enforcement by the establishment of the Tribunal under Article 235A of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Uganda.3 The Constitution does not provide for criminal forfeiture or civil 
forfeiture. 
3.3 The Leadership Code Act (2002) 
 
The Leadership Code Act does not create any corruption-related offences but regulates the 
conduct of leaders and the acceptance of gifts and benefits; and requires leaders to declare 
their incomes, assets and liabilities.Under the Leadership Code, the President and his 
ministers, members of parliament, judges and civil servants are required to declare their 
                                                          
1 Article 233 of the Constitution. 
2 Article 235A of the Constitution. 
3 See Ruhweza DR ‘Frustrated or Frustrating?: The Inspector General of the Government and the 
Question of Political Corruption in Uganda’ (2008) HURIPEC Working Paper No. 20.  
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assets. 4 Asset declarations are to be made upon the designated person assuming office, 
every two years thereafter5 and also upon leaving office.6 Leaders are required also to 
submit similar information in respect of spouses, children and dependants.7 These 
declarations are made public and include information on assets, liabilities and income8 
which information is important during investigations and tracing of proceeds of corruption. 
 The Leadership Code Act is enforced by the Inspector General of Government (IGG).9 
Where there is a breach of the Code,10 the IGG will inquire into the alleged misconduct.11 
During investigations and inquiries, the IGG has powers to place restrictions on the 
operation of any bank account12 or property13 of a person being investigated to prevent 
dissipation of funds or to ensure payment of compensation. A leader is allowed reasonable 
access to the account for subsistence funds.14 Also, the IGG may authorise an officer to 
inspect a bank account, share account, purchase account or expense account safe in a 
bank.15These provisions are meant to help to identify, trace, freeze or seize corrupt 
proceeds. 
After investigations and inquiries, the IGG will issue a report.16  The report should record the 
nature of and circumstances surrounding the breach, a summary of the evidence against the 
                                                          
4 Section 4 of the Leadership Code Act. 
5 Section 4(2)(b) of the Leadership Code Act. 
6 Section 4(3) of the Leadership Code Act. 
7 Section 4(4) of the Leadership Code Act. 
8 Section 7 of the Leadership Code Act. 
9 Section 3(1) of the Leadership Code Act. 
10 Breaches of the Leadership Code Act by a Leader may be reported through complaints lodged under 
section 18(1). 
11 See section 18(2) of the Leadership Code Act. 
12 Section 22(1) of the Leadership Code Act. 
13 Section 22(3) of the Leadership Code Act. 
14 Section 22(2) of the Leadership Code Act. 
15 Section 30(1) of the Leadership Code Act. 
16 Section 19(1) of the Leadership Code Act. 
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leader in question, and the findings of the investigation.17  The report may recommend 
criminal proceedings or any other action against the leader. 
One of the actions that can be taken against the leader is forfeiture. Section 21 of the Act 
provides for forfeiture of property where a leader is proved to have obtained such property 
in violation of the Code. The property will then be held in trust for the government until 
disposal.18 The IGG may require such person to pay compensation to the government or 
other public body for any loss suffered.19 Confiscation of corrupt proceeds provided for 
under the Act is administrative and not conviction-based. In practice, it is an administrative 
arrangement that may apply when public officials offer to refund stolen assets instead of 
being prosecuted. In the year 2013, the IGG recovered $470 000 in this way.20 
Other penalties for the breach of the Code include confiscation of excess or undeclared 
property21 and gifts or benefits.22 However, the IGG currently is unable to enforce any of 
these actions, penalties and decisions in the absence of a Leadership Code Tribunal. The 
case of Nestor MuchumbiGasasira vs Inspector General of Government &The Attorney 
General23best illustrates this point. In that case, the IGG carried out inquiries into the 
appellant’s income, assets and liabilities. During the investigations, the IGG found that the 
appellant, who was the Principal Accountant in the Ministry of Finance, allegedly had 
property in excess of what he had declared. The IGG gave directions for the appellant’s 
dismissal and for forfeiture of the excess undeclared property. On appeal, the Court set 
aside the orders and found that such penalties, including forfeiture, could be imposed only 
                                                          
17 Section 19(2) of the Leadership Code Act. 
18 Section 21 (1) of the Leadership Code Act. 
19 Section 21(2) of the Leadership Code Act. 
20 Inspectorate of Government (2014) 6. 
21 Section 35(a) of the Leadership Code Act. 
22 Section 35(c)(i) of the Leadership Code Act. 
23 HCT-00-CV-CA-0062/2009. 
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by the proposed Tribunal under Article 235A of the Constitution of Uganda, after complaints 
had been heard by the Tribunal. 
Proposals have been made for the amendment of the Leadership Code Act through the 
Leadership Code (Amendment) Bill to establish the Leadership Code Tribunal, but the Bill is 
yet to be passed.24 Absence of the Leadership Code Tribunal means that provisions on 
administrative forfeiture cannot be enforced. 
Another shortcoming of the Leadership Code Act is thatit lacks comprehensive provisions on 
the asset recovery process. Moreover, proposed amendments to the Leadership Code Act 
do not seem to include provisions for civil forfeiture. 
3.4  The Anti-Corruption Act (2009) 
 
The Anti-Corruption Act of 200925is the main piece of anti-corruption legislation in Uganda. 
It criminalises corrupt acts, prescribes penalties and provides for the investigative powers of 
the Inspector General of Government (IGG) and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). 
In order to help trace corrupt proceeds the IGG and the DPP are granted special 
investigative powers under the Act.26 The IGG and DPP can authorise an Assistant 
Superintendent or any officer above that rank, an Inspectorate Officer or a special 
investigator to investigate a bank  account, share account or purchase account of a person 
reasonably suspected of having committed an offence under the Act.27 
                                                          
24 See The Observer ‘Lokodo’s hands tied as cabinet fails to approve graft tribunal’ 15 September 2014 
available at www.observer.ug/index. 
25 It repealed the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1970 under Section 68 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
26 Section 33 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
27 Section 33 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
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The court may restrict disposal of assets or bank accounts, upon application by the DPP or 
IGG in order to enable compensation of victims and to prevent dissipation.28 The Act also 
provides for the recovery of corruptly acquired assets as a civil debt or as compensation. 
Under section 28, a principal who gives a gift to an agent in contravention of the Act, can 
recover the money or value of the gratification as a civil debt from the agent or the person 
who gave the gratification to the agent. An acquittal or conviction against the agent is not a 
bar to such an action.29 
Section 35 provides that an agent convicted of an offence maybe liable to pay compensation 
to the principal who suffered loss as a result of the commission of the offence. Such 
compensationis to be paid out of any money or property belonging to the convicted person. 
Where compensation is to be paid out of property, such property will be sold and proceeds 
of the sale will be awarded to the convicted person to the extent of the loss. 
The Anti-Corruption Act makes provision for restraining orders to preserve tainted 
property.30  The court may issue such orders, upon application by an authorised officer, to 
prevent the disposal of property in possession of a person charged with an offence or about 
to be charged.31 Such application is to be supported by an affidavit stating the grounds of 
belief that the said property is tainted32in relation to the offence, and also that the property 
is likely to be subject to a confiscation order.33 Notice of application for the restraining order 
                                                          
28 Section 34 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
29 Section 28 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
30 Section 53 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
31 Section 53 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
32 Section 54(d) of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
33 Section 54(f) of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
is to be given to third parties who may have an interest in the property, unless doing so will 
prejudice the property.34 
If the court is satisfied that the property should be subject to a restraining order, it will issue 
the order prohibiting disposal of the property or any other dealing that may be contrary to 
the order35 and may appoint a person to manage or otherwise deal with the property.36 
Once the restraining order is issued, it gives directions for, inter alia, determination of any 
dispute arising from the property, 37payment of administration of the property, 38payment 
of a subsistence allowance39 and legal expenses for the accused.40 Any disposition of or 
dealing with property that is subject to a restraining order is null and void and may be set 
aside by the court.41 The provisions regarding restraining orders, however, are not 
mandatory. 
The Act provides also for confiscation of corruptly acquired proceeds. It defines confiscation 
to include forfeiture and permanent deprivation of property by order of court where 
applicable.42 In effect, this includes civil forfeiture but such cases are yet to be instituted. 
The court may make an order for confiscation of property of a convicted person which has 
been acquired directly or indirectly through an act of corruption.43  Such property will then 
vest in the government.44 A confiscation order may be issued also where a person facing 
charges, dies or absconds, upon application by the IGG or DPP, acting on a belief that the 
                                                          
34 Section 57 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
35 Section 55(a) of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
36 Section 55(b) of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
37 Section 56(1)(a) of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
38 Section 56(1)(b) of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
39 Section 56(1)(c)(i) of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
40 Section 56(1)(c)(iii) of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
41 Section 60(1) of the Anti- Corruption Act. 
42 Section 1 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
43 Section 63(1) of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
44 Section 63(2) of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
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property is tainted.45 The DPP or IGG must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
property in question is tainted.  
This provision for civil forfeiture is restricted to cases where there is a charge against a 
person who dies or disappears. This is a significant weakness of the Act and means that 
where there is insufficient evidence, or failure to prosecute a high ranking public official, or 
even failure to secure a conviction, the proceeds of corruption still cannot be recovered. 
Moreover, the standard of proof is proof beyond reasonable doubt which is difficult to meet 
in such circumstances compared to the usual standard of proof on a balance of probabilities 
commonly used for civil forfeiture cases. Thus, there is need for legal reform in this respect.  
Further, the provisions on criminal confiscation are not mandatory and are left to the 
discretion of the court.  Confiscation is also not a sentence allowed for separately under the 
Act or under any other law, and can be imposed only in addition to other sentences fixed 
under the Act.   Further, confiscation of assets registered in the names of associates, 
relatives or friends is not provided for in the Act. This is a loophole likely to be taken 
advantage of by corrupt public officials who may register proceeds of crime in the names of 
spouses, children or business partners. 
Additionally, the definition of assets recoverable is insufficient as the Act omits to outline 
specifically the nature of property recoverable.  Property is defined under the Act to mean 
movables and immovables, corporeals andincorporeals.46 The Act does not define the term 
proceeds. It does not consider also what would happen in the case of commingled proceeds, 
the determination of benefit or value acquired by a corrupt official where the original 
proceeds cannot be traced, substitute assets or even for assets of other forms of value. 
                                                          
45 Section 65(1) of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
46 Section 1 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
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Significantly, the Anti-Corruption Act omits also to provide for the management and disposal 
of assets, international co-operation and mutual legal assistance matters, establishment of 
an asset forfeiture unit to manage and maintain property that has been restrained or 
confiscated, and an enforcement authority.Further, the Act contains only scanty provisions 
on the asset recovery process as a whole. 
3.5   The Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Bill (2013) 
 
There have been proposals to amend the Anti-Corruption Act of 2009. One such proposal is 
the Anti-Corruption Bill, a private member’s bill47 which is currently before the Legal Affairs 
Committee of parliament, before being debated in parliament.48The Bill notes that there are 
gaps in the Anti-Corruption Act and that: 
 ‘due to the nature of offences under the Anti-Corruption Act, it is very difficult to 
prove  that a particular property was derived directly or indirectly from an act of 
corruption. This creates a lacuna in the law given that securing a conviction does not 
necessarily guarantee that the convicted person will make good the loss occasioned 
to the government or any other organisation. There is, therefore, a need to amend 
the Anti-Corruption Act in order to bridge the gap.’ 
 
The Bill contains eleven clauses but this discussion will focus onthose clauses relevant to 
confiscation. Clause 4 seeks to insert a new section 21A into the Anti-Corruption Act in order 
to deter people from dealing with property that is suspected of being the proceeds of 
corruption. Clause 5 seeks to place restrictions on the bank accounts of accused persons. It 
advocates the repeal of section 34(5) of the Act, which states that the DPP is to ensure that 
an order issued in relation to the restrictions on property or bank accounts of an accused 
                                                          
47 According to the ruling party’s chief whip, the government supports the Bill. 
48 This is the position as of 28August 2013. See The Daily Monitor ‘Anti-Corruption Bill 2013 tabled in 
Parliament’ 28August 2013.  
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person be served on such a person. These two clauses appear to be redundant because the 
issues they raise already are dealt with under section 34 of the Anti-Corruption Act, which 
places restrictions on the disposal of an accused’s property or bank account to ensure 
compensation. 
Under Clause 7 of the Bill, there are proposals to replace section 63 of the Anti-Corruption 
Act and to introduce the idea of mandatory confiscation of corrupt proceeds. The object of 
this proposal is to ensure that corrupt proceeds can be recovered without proof that the 
property is derived from an act of corruption. However, this clause seems to run counter to 
the way in which confiscation usually works and would be a violation of constitutionally 
protected rights. In order for property to be confiscated, it must be proved on a balance of 
probabilities to be tainted and to have been derived from an act of corruption. 
The powers and duties of a public trustee, presumably in relation to confiscated property, 
are outlined under clause 8.  Clause 9 aspires to introduce a provision on powers of the 
Minister of Ethics and Integrity to regulate the remuneration of the public trustee. The Anti-
Corruption Act currently provides that confiscated property is to vest in the government and 
does not specify the authority which is to receive and manage it.49 Appointment of a public 
trustee to manage confiscated assets thus wouldresolve this uncertainty. The Leadership 
Code Act, however, already provides for an agent or broker appointed by the Inspectorate 
of Government in whom confiscated property vests. This may lead to duplication of roles, a 
possibility which highlights the need to harmonise the current provisions on this issue. 
                                                          
49 Section 63(2) of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
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A perusal of the Amendment Bill shows that it would go a long way in addressing some of 
the loopholes in the Anti-Corruption Act. However, it still falls short and runs the risk of not 
engaging pertinent gaps in the Anti-Corruption Act, as discussed above.  
Also, the bill does not make any reference to the Anti-Money Laundering Act, which 
contains provisions on forfeiture, discussed later on in this chapter.   
3.6 Proceeds of Corruption Assets Recovery Bill (2013) 
 
This Bill, proposed by the Ministry of Ethics and Integrity to help recover corruptly acquired 
assets,is not available to the public yet. The Bill, according to reports, has been handled by 
the First Parliamentary Counsel and is before the Cabinet. Reports indicate that it aims to 
empower anti-corruption agencies to trace, freeze or seize, and confiscate and dispose of 
assets of individuals implicated in corruption.50The Bill will specifically provide for civil 
recovery of corruptly acquired assets. The Bill is meant also to empower the Inspectorate of 
Government (IG), the Criminal Intelligence and Investigations Directorate (CIID) and theDPP 
to follow up on corruptly acquired assets of accused persons. Its provisions will, extend to 
spouses, children and business partners of officials, especially in efforts to make up for the 
difference where the assets of the convicted person fall short.51 
The Bill is also meant to facilitate compensation of victims of corruption and recovery of 
resources lost to corruption. It aims also to establish asset recovery processes, and provide 
the appropriate management of seized proceeds and instrumentalities of corruption.52 
                                                          
50 Walubiri ‘Tough Anti-Graft Bill awaits Cabinet Nod in The New Vision20 January 2013. 
51 Walubiri ‘ToughAnti-Graft Bill awaits Cabinet Nodin The New Vision20 January 2013. 
52 Statement of the Minister of State for Ethics and Integrity at the 4th IAACA Annual Seminar in Dalian, 
China, June 2012. 
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Once made public, there is need to analyse the Bill to ascertain whether it takes into 
account Uganda’s commitments in regional and international conventions, in relation to civil 
recovery of corruptly acquired assets and asset recovery as a whole. Given the loopholes in 
the Anti-Corruption Act highlighted previously however, the Bill is a big step forward. By 
providing for civil forfeiture and asset recovery, itpromises to open a new chapter in 
Uganda’s asset recovery legal regime. 
3.7 The Anti-Money Laundering Act (2013) 
 
This Act criminalises laundering of proceeds of all offences designated under the laws of 
Uganda, including corruption.53The Act empowers authorised officers to carry out 
investigations necessary for identifying, tracing, freezing or seizing, and eventually 
confiscating and disposing of illicitly acquired property. Section 44 of the Act empowers an 
authorised officer to make an exparteapplication in court for production of documents 
necessary for identifying, locating, quantifying or transferring tainted property, where the 
officer suspects a person reasonably to be in possession or control of such property.54 The 
officer is granted authority to inspect, copy or retain such documents under the production 
order.55 The Act authorises officers to search land and premises in order to seize documents 
that they believe may be helpful for locating property.56 The above provisions apply also in 
cases where a foreign state seeks assistance in locating or seizing property which is 
suspected to be tainted property.57 
                                                          
53 Section 1(a) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
54 See also section 45 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
55 Section 46(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
56 Section 49 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
57 Section 55 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
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The Act allows an authorised officer to enter any land or premises to search for tainted 
property and to seize any documents58 or to apply for a search warrant in respect of tainted 
property59 and to seize it. In other words, the act allows an authorised officer to search 
premises for tainted property without a search warrant if he has reasonable suspicion or in 
the case of emergency searches and seizures, to prevent loss or destruction of the said 
property.60 Lastly, the Act allows for searches with a search warrant. Searches and seizures 
can be carried out also in respect of tainted property upon request by a foreign state.61 
An authorised officer may apply also for a restraining order in relation to the property of a 
person who is under criminal investigation, or has been charged or convicted for money 
laundering or any other crime.62 An authorised officer can apply exparte to court also for a 
monitoring order to compel a financial institution to give information about transactions 
through an account held by a person suspected to be about to commit a crime or to have 
committed a crime, or who has benefited from or was involved in a crime.63 
Under the Act, confiscation is defined to include forfeiture, and it means the permanent 
deprivation of property by an order of court.64 This definition by implication includes both 
criminal and civil forfeiture.   In addition to any other sentence imposed, a confiscation 
order may be made against tainted property or property in which a convicted person has an 
interest. 65 An authorised officer can apply also to court for confiscation of additional 
                                                          
58 Section 61 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
59 Section 62 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
60 Section 67 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
61 Section 70 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
62 Section 71 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
63 Sections 56, 57 and 59 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
64 Section 1 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
65 Section 83(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
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property that may have been discovered after conviction.66The court may issue an order for 
confiscation upon application once it is shown that certain property is tainted in relation to 
a crime.67 The provision does not specify the official or authority responsible for making the 
application but refers to an applicant.  
In order to determine if property is tainted, the court must consider whether the property 
was used for or in connection with the committed crime or whether the property was 
derived from the crime, and the convict person’s income cannot, on proof on a balance of 
probabilities, enable the acquisition of that property.68 The effect of a confiscation order is 
that it vests the property absolutely in the Republic of Uganda.69 
The Anti-Money Laundering Act provides for civil forfeiture but only in limited 
circumstances, similar to the Anti-Corruption Act. Forfeiture can be carried out only where a 
person who is undergoing investigations dies or absconds, and is about to be charged or has 
been charged already; or has been convicted of a crime or before the commencement of 
investigations in respect of such a person.70The court has to be satisfied on a balance of 
probabilities.71 
Third party interests are provided for under the Act, where an applicant who has a legal 
interest in the property, was not involved in the commission of the crime and acquired the 
interest for reasonable consideration with no knowledge of the circumstances or the fact 
that the property was used to commit the crime. In such instances the court will issue an 
order declaring the nature and extent of the applicant’s legal interest or directing the 
                                                          
66 Section 83(2) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
67 Section 86(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
68 Section 86(2) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
69 Section 87 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
70 Section 85 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
71 Section 85(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
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Republic of Uganda to transfer the property to the applicant or to make payments 
equivalent to the value of obtaining to the applicant’s interest.72 
The court can make an order for payment instead of confiscation in certain circumstances, 
including where the property has lost value, cannot be located or has been transferred to a 
third party.73 The Act outlines rules that should be considered in determining the benefit 
and the value derived from the commission of a crime by an individual.74 The court is 
granted powers also to make orders for the sale or transfer of confiscated property.75 
Section 104 outlines the management of restrained and confiscated property. It requires 
regulations to be made to help in the management of restrained and confiscated property. 
These regulations, however, have not been drafted to date.  
Property derived from foreign crimes and which is within Uganda may be confiscated upon 
request by an affected state, provided that the requirements of dual criminality are met.76 
Under provisions for international co-operation, the Minister may enter into agreement 
with the ministry or department of any other country for the purposes of exchange or 
sharing of information.77 Section 106 requires the court or other competent authority in 
Uganda to co-operate with the competent authorities in other states in order to enforce 
measures such as confiscation.  
A competent authority in Uganda may make requests to another state or enforce requests 
from another state for legal assistance in relation to civil, criminal, administrative or 
investigative matters and also to identify, trace, freeze, seize or confiscate property derived 
                                                          
72 Section 89(2) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
73 Section 91 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
74 Section 93 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
75 Section 101 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
76 Section 102 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
77 Section 105 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
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from corruptly acquired assets.78 A foreign judgment or confiscation order regarding 
property derived from money laundering or other crimes may be used as evidence in 
confiscation proceedings.79 
The Act provides for direct or indirect enforcement of foreign orders for confiscation. An 
authorised officer in Uganda can submit a foreign request to court in order to obtain a 
confiscation order or enforce an order granted by a court of a requesting state.80Proceeds 
of crime recovered in Uganda shall be transferred to a foreign state upon request. The 
Minister may deduct all expenses incurred in the recovery of proceeds.81 Section 112 
outlines measures for the disposal of confiscated property. Property confiscated through 
foreign requests may be disposed of in accordance with regulations to be made under the 
Act. These regulations have not been drafted either, which hinders enforcement of this 
provision. 
Upon request by the affected state, the court should consider returning confiscated 
property to the requesting state party to enable compensation or return to the legitimate 
owners.82 The section also requires that the court or competent authority make 
arrangements or reach conclusions for sharing of assets or funds that have been 
confiscated,83 or contributing the value of such assets to government agencies in fighting 
against money laundering and other crimes or sharing funds that have been derived from 
the sale of assets. 
                                                          
78 Section 107 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
79 Section 108 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
80 Section 109(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
81 Section 110 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
82 Section 112(2) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
83 Section 112 (3) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
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Section 103 of the Act provides for the establishment of a special account with funds to help 
in the management and maintenance of restrained or confiscated property. The fund is 
meant also to pay for the expenses of trustees or other authorised officers who have been 
appointed to enforce the provisions of the Act. This fund too, yet is to be established.  
In conclusion, the Anti-Money Laundering Act contains more comprehensive provisions on 
asset recovery in comparison to the Anti-Corruption Act. However, its main focus is not 
recovery of corruptly acquired assets and it does not, in fact make any reference to the Anti-
Corruption Act. This also highlights the current problem of duplicity of provisions in 
Uganda’s asset recovery regime. 
A significant weakness of the Act is that it restricts the application of civil forfeiture to only a 
few instances, which limits the successful recovery of corruptly acquired proceeds.  Another 
weakness is the failure to provide for or designate a particular asset forfeiture unit or 
competent authority to enforce the relevant provisions of the Act. Instead reference is 
made to an authorised officer, competent body or applicant to carry out processes involved 
in civil forfeiture. The Anti-Corruption Act on the other refers to the IGG and the DPP. 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
The Anti-Corruption Act, which is the main piece of anti-corruption legislation, is 
complemented by the Leadership Code Act of 2002 and the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 
2013.  Although both the Anti-Corruption Act and the Anti-Money Laundering Act allow for 
civil recovery of assets, they do so onlyby implication. Further, the asset recovery provisions 
contained in both Acts do not support civil recovery of corruptly acquired assets or asset 
recovery adequately. Moreover, civil forfeiture can apply only in cases of death or flight.   
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There is also duplication of efforts in the current legislation in relation to asset recovery, as 
contained in the Anti-Corruption Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Act and the Leadership 
Code Act. 
The current efforts aimed at amending the Anti-Corruption Act and introducing 
comprehensive legislation on recovery of proceeds, including the Anti-Corruption 
(Amendment) Bill of 2013, and the Recovery of Proceeds of Corruption Bill of 2013,are 
praiseworthy efforts but need to take into account the pertinent gaps, mentioned above, in 
order to build an effective civil forfeiture and asset recovery legal regime. The Bills should 
also address Uganda’s commitments in regional and international anti-corruption 
conventions, specifically through making provision for mutual legal assistance and 
international co-operation, to enable civil recovery of corruptly acquired assets both at the 
domestic level and across borders. It is recognised that the two Bills are not final and some 
of the outstanding issues may be addressed eventually.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BASIC ELEMENTS OF CIVIL FORFEITURE LAW 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses the salient issues that should be considered in enactment of the 
Proceeds of Corruption Assets Recovery Bill (2013) and the Anti-Corruption (Amendment) 
Bill 2013, based on existing loopholes in the current anti-corruption legal regime, some of 
which have been highlighted in the previous chapter. It canvasses important issues 
pertaining to civil forfeiture law including the definition of key terms, establishment of an 
enforcement body, key procedural and evidentiary issues, and human rights and 
constitutional challenges.  
4.2     Basic Concepts in Civil Forfeiture Law 
4.2.1     Definition of Key Terms 
 
The assets or proceeds which are subject to civil forfeiture must be defined. The widest 
possible range of assets should be subject to confiscation. In the process of enacting the law 
on civil forfeiture, proceeds, instrumentalities, commingled proceeds and substitute assets 
should be listed among assets that are forfeitable.1As pointed out in the previous chapter, 
Uganda’s current legislation does not define comprehensively the nature of assets subject 
to confiscation. This section considers the types of proceeds that should be 
consideredunder the new legislation.  
                                                          
1 Greenberg (2009) 38. 
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4.2.1.1     Proceeds 
 
The term “proceeds” needs to be defined clearly in the civil forfeiture legislation to ensure 
that all forms of assets are captured under said legislation. Proceeds have been defined 
generally as valuable items that are obtained directly or indirectly as a result of 
crime.2Indirect proceeds are those that accrue where there is an increase in the value of 
proceeds. Thus profits which accrue from corruptly acquired assets can be 
recoverable.3Some jurisdictions have adopted the definitions of proceeds contained in 
UNCAC and the Palermo Convention as a guide.4 
4.2.1.2     Instrumentalities 
 
These are items that may be used to commit a crime. They must have been used 
substantially in the commission of the offence in order to be regarded as instrumentalities.5 
For instance, in the South African case of NDPP v RO Cook & Others, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal found that the items must have been instrumental to the accused person in 
committing the crime. This should be specified in the legislation. The Court also held that 
there must be a “functional relation” between the property and the crime. The definition of 
“use” should be considered also in order to avoid uncertainties.6 
4.2.1.3     Commingled Proceeds 
 
Sometimes proceeds may be laundered and mixed with legitimate assets or maybe 
converted into other assets. Civil forfeiture may aim at recovery of the part of the assets 
                                                          
2 Brunet al (2011). 
3 Council of Europe (2013) 88. 
4 Brunet al (2011) 108. 
5             NDPP v. R O Cook Properties (260/3) [2004] ZASCA 36. 
6 Brunet al(2011) 111. 
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that are tainted or may provide for confiscation of all proceeds, including the non-proceeds 
that were mingled with the proceeds of crime. An example is South Africa’s Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act of 1998 which provides for confiscation of all assets, including those 
that have been mingled with proceeds of crime. The civil forfeiture statute should be 
couched in language that provides for such options and should allow also for forfeiture of 
commingled assets.7 
4.2.1.4    Substitute Assets  
Where it is proved that the accused derived proceeds from crime but they cannot be traced, 
any other untainted property belonging to the accused person ought to be attached. These 
are known as substitute assets and they must be of equal value to the proceeds of crime 
derived by the accused person.8Forfeiture of substitute assets may take place where it is not 
possible to locate the actual assets, after all reasonable efforts to do so; if the assets have 
been transferred outside the court’s jurisdiction; where the assets have been transferred to 
a third party; and when proceeds have diminished in value or have been concealed. In some 
jurisdictions, the law provides for confiscation of substitute assets which must be owned by 
the accused person and must have equal value to those assets that have dissipated.9 
                                                          
7 Brunet al (2011) 109. See also Article 31(4) & (5) of UNCAC and Article 12 of the Palermo Convention. 
8 Greenberg et al(2009). 
9 See for instance Colombia Law 793, Article 3; and the United States Code, Section 853 (p). 
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In other jurisdictions, the defendant may be required to pay an amount equivalent to the 
assets.10 If such provisions are not included in a civil forfeiture statute, then criminals may 
have an incentive to hide, transfer or use proceeds of corruption as quickly as possible to 
avoid their being forfeited. 
4.2.1.5     Assets of Other Forms of Value 
 
It is important to consider also other forms of value like shares, intangible assets such as 
royalties or literary proceeds, stocks, or information recorded in various forms. Further, 
terms that can encompass all forms of value should be used to avoid having to resort to 
amendments every few years.11 Greenberg et al refer to terms such as recordings, 
documents and materials to encompass forms of information and objects ranging from 
material in photographic form like videotapes and discs; handmade materials like paintings 
or drawings;  and electronic materials including discs, electronic notebooks memory sticks 
and other electric or digital data storage devices. 
4.2.1.6     Proceeds Derived from Foreign Offences 
 
The statute should provide also for confiscation of assets that have been derived from 
offences committed abroad and that are listed as offences under a country’s criminal legal 
regime.12 The statute may designate particular corruption crimes to which this provision 
applies.  
 
                                                          
10 The Republic Act 1960, Section 12 (c) (Philippines). 
11 Greenberg  et al (2009). 
12 Brunet al (2011) 110. 
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4.2.2  Enforcement Authorities 
4.2.2.1  Establishing an Enforcement Authority 
 
Civil forfeiture law usually establishes enforcement authorities that are in charge of 
enforcing the new legislation. South Africa established the Asset Forfeiture Unit, within the 
office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions, which is responsible for both criminal 
confiscation and civil forfeiture.13 The United Kingdom initially entrusted this duty to a new 
body, the Asset Recovery Agency,but eventually transferred its powers to the Serious Fraud 
Office, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Serious and Organised Crime Agency.14 
Uganda already has established various institutions to combat corruption and prosecute 
corruption related offences including the Directorate for Ethics and Integrity (DEI) which is 
mandated to guide and develop anti-corruption policies and legal frameworks and to 
oversee the implementation of anti-corruption legislation.15 
The Office of the Inspectorate of Government (IG)commonly referred to as the Inspector of 
General of Government (IGG), which is established under Chapter 13 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Uganda of 1995 (as amended), is responsible for investigations and 
prosecutions of offences related to corruption, abuse of authority and public office.16 The 
Inspectorate of Government also enforces the Leadership Code Act and, as already noted, 
has powers to confiscate stolen assets through administrative forfeiture. The Inspectorate 
                                                          
13 Council of Europe (2014) 55-58. 
14 Council of Europe (2014) 64. 
15 www.dei.go.ug. It is established under the Ministry of Ethics and Integrity. 
16 Section 8 of the Inspectorate of Government of Act 2002 and ‘The IGG’ available at www.go.ug 
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of Government Act also gives the IG the mandate to eliminate and foster the elimination of 
corruption and abuse of authority and public office.17 
 The Directorate of Public Prosecutions which is responsible for prosecution of criminal acts 
in the entire country is established under article 120 of the Constitution of Uganda.18 The 
DPP has a special unit responsible for prosecuting corrupt offences. Consequently, the DPP 
and the IGG would be well suited to enforce civil forfeiture in Uganda.  
4.2.2.2     Investigative Agency 
 
An authority which is responsible for conducting investigations in relation to corruptly 
acquired assets should be established legislatively. In Uganda, both the IGG and the DPP are 
responsible for investigations in relation to asset recovery. The IGG is mandated to 
investigate cases of corruption and abuse of public office. The DPP relies on the specialised 
fraud squad of the Criminal Investigations Department of the Police to carry out 
investigations, but may offer legal advice and guidance in such situations. The DPP is 
empoweredunder the Anti-Corruption Act to order investigations of a bank account, share 
account or purchase account. The DPP can apply also for orders to limit or restrict the 
transfer or disposal of assets of persons accused of carrying out corrupt acts. The DPP may 
authorise also the inspection of documents and the obtaining of documents and other 
information. The IGG is bestowed with similar powers to enforce production and disclosure 
orders.19 
The DPP and IGG both have powers of search and seizure. Under section 41 of the Anti-
Corruption Act, the DPP and IGG may compel a person employed by a public body to 
                                                          
17 Section 8(1)(b) of the Inspectorate of Government Act of 2002. 
18 See ‘What is DPP’ available at www.dpp.go.ug. 
19 Section 37 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
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produce information about property he owns. The IGG is empowered also to conduct 
inquiries and investigations.20 These powers should be extended to the civil forfeiture 
legislation. 
Other important investigative powers for consideration include customer information 
orders and account monitoring orders, the latter being provided for under the Anti-Money 
Laundering Act.21 Customer information is information about whether a person has held an 
account at a particular financial institution.22The account monitoring order relates to 
information relating to a particular account.23 
4.2.2.3     Recovered Assets Fund 
 
The Anti-Corruption Act does not make provision for an assets recovery body. The 
recovered assets fund is necessary to pay expenses for management and maintenance of 
restrained and confiscated property. It also would meet the remuneration expenses for the 
receiver, trustee or the authority appointed under the civil forfeiture legislation to enforce 
the act. 
Further, after hearing and after any appeals, the civil forfeiture order becomes permanent. 
The responsible agency will then take possession of the confiscated property and sell it off. 
The money acquired from the sale will be deposited into the recovered assets fund and used 
either for law enforcement purposes or to compensate victims.24 
 
                                                          
20 Section 12 of the IGG Act. 
21 Sections 56 and 57 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
22 Council of Europe (2014) 90. 
23 Council of Europe (2014) 90. 
24 Council of Europe (2014) 91. 
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4.2.3     International Co-operation 
 
Provisions on international co-operation enable enforcement of requests for foreign 
preservation and confiscation orders.The Anti-Corruption Act contains scanty provisions on 
international co-operation. Taking this into consideration, the upcoming law on 
forfeiture,should be finalised in relation to Uganda’s commitments under articles 51-59 of 
UNCAC to facilitate recovery of corruptly acquired assets across borders.  
The new law should provide for various aspects of asset recovery including tracing, freezing, 
seizing and confiscation orders both domestically and at the international level, and should 
propose the possibility of direct enforcement of foreign civil forfeiture orders. The law 
should provide also for the transfer or return of confiscated property to its country of origin. 
4.2.4   Civil Proceedings 
 
Article 53 of UNCAC, as previously discussed, requires state parties to put in place legislation 
that allows another state to institute civil litigation for the recovery of proceeds and also to 
enable it join proceedings for compensation. Such a provision will benefit not only Uganda 
in terms of international co-operation and mutual legal assistance but also is a way for the 
country to meet its obligations under this article. 
4.2.5   Recovered Property and Expenses 
 
It is important to make provisions on procedures to be taken for the handling of confiscated 
proceeds. There must be provisions also for disposal of property.  
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
4.2.6   Standard of Proof 
 
The common standard of proof used in civil forfeiture proceedings is proof on a balance of 
probabilities,25 which means that the facts appear more likely true than not. This standard 
of proof is used in civil proceedings in common law jurisdictions such as Ugandaand is also 
the internationally accepted standard of proof for civil forfeiture proceedings.26It is 
advantageous because it is easier to meet compared to the standard of proof in criminal 
proceedings which is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The new legislation should provide 
clearly for this standard of proof. 
4.2.7    Third Party Rights 
 
While the Anti-Money Laundering Act considers third party rights, the Anti-Corruption Act 
does not. Confiscation may affect third parties and therefore provision should be made for 
third party interests in the new civil forfeiture legislation.A third party should be given 
notice of forfeiture proceedings, and should be availed other fair trial guarantees, like the 
right of appeal.27 The law should allow a person who has been affected by the order to 
apply within a certain time to exclude the order from his legal interests if that person did 
not receive notification.28However, where the third party was complicit in the offence or 
had prior knowledge that the property was proceeds of corruption, then that property 
should be subject to forfeiture proceedings. In cases where the third party acquired the 
property in good faith, such property should not be subject to forfeiture. 
 
                                                          
25 See Greenberg (2009) 59. 
26 NamulodiHasadivs Uganda SCCA 16/97 and CoE (2014) 44. 
27 Attiso (2010) 12. 
28 Council of Europe (2014) 87. 
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4.3          Principal Constitutional and Human Rights Challenges of Civil Forfeiture 
 
This section highlights the main legal challenges that are commonly raised in respect of civil 
forfeiture legislation, and are likely to be raised in respect of Uganda’s new asset recovery 
law. It discusses constitutional and human rights challenges and how they have been 
addressed in other jurisdictions.Legal challenges such as whether civil forfeiture proceedings 
are civil and not criminal proceedings in nature and whether, as a result, they violate 
protections guaranteed for criminal proceedings; and whether civil forfeiture interferes with 
property rightsare discussed in detail below. 
4.3.1      Civil Forfeiture Proceedings are Civil in Nature 
 
Civil forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature and not criminal. Legal challenges may be 
raised as to whether civil forfeiture proceedings are criminal or civil in nature and whether 
as a result they offend protections offered for criminal proceedings. In Charrington29it was 
found that there was no charge, arrest, conviction or penalty or criminal record and in the 
absence of such hallmarks, civil forfeiture proceedings were civil in nature. In Gale vs SOCA30 
it was found that civil forfeiture proceedings do not enjoy protections offered in criminal 
proceedings. Further, the Supreme Court of Canada found in Charterjee vs Ontario31 that 
civil forfeiture laws were civil and imposed no penalty. 
Whether civil forfeiture proceedings are civil or criminal in nature also raises issues of 
double jeopardy. Both criminal proceedings and civil forfeiture proceedings may be 
instituted against a person without violating the protections against double jeopardy. In 
                                                          
29 Charrington [2005] EWCA Civ 335. 
30 Gale vs SOCA UKSC 2010/190. 
31 Chatterjee vs Ontario 2009 SCCA 17. 
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such cases, it is possible to convict an accused person and still initiate separate civil 
forfeiture proceedings. Various jurisdictions have held that civil forfeiture is not penal in 
nature and thus imposing it after a conviction would not be a punishment.32 In United States 
vs Ursery, the defendants hadbeen prosecuted but were faced still with civil forfeiture 
proceedings. The question raised was whether this amounted to facing a second 
prosecution. The Supreme Court found that in rem proceedings did not amount to a 
punishment but were simply a means of getting back property that a person did not own. 
Civil forfeiture was found to be a remedial civil action, and also different from other civil 
penalties, including fines and compensation.33 
 
Civil forfeiture proceedings no doubt will appear to infringe the presumption of innocence. 
In criminal proceedings, one is presumed innocent until proved guilty.34 In civil forfeiture 
proceedings, property may be confiscated without a conviction, 35that is, without proof of 
guilt. This may appear to be a violation of the presumption of innocence. However, it has 
been held by the European Court of Human Rights that legal presumptions in civil forfeiture 
cases do not violate the presumption of innocence as long as they are reasonable and 
rebuttable.36 Further, given that civil forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature and not 
criminal, the presumption of innocence may not apply.37 
 
                                                          
32 See United States v Ursery518 US 267, 278 (1996).  See also Walsh v Director of the Assets Recovery 
Agency [2005] NICA 6 (Northern Ireland Court of Appeal). 
33 See United States v Ursery518 US 267, 278 (1996). 
34 See Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 28(3)(a) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Uganda. 
35 Attiso (2010) 12. 
36 See Salabiakuvs France  (1988) 13 EHRR 379. 
37 Attiso (2010) 12. 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
4.3.2  Interference with Property Rights 
 
 The process of seizure, restraint and civil forfeiture may deprive an individual of his 
property temporarily or permanently. This may create the impression of infringing on a 
person’s property rights, since there is no conviction to found the deprivation.The right to 
own property is protected under the Constitution of most states and in international human 
rights conventions such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the African 
Convention on Human and Peoples Rights.However it is not absolute. Article 1 of the 
Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights explains the nature of this right.  It 
states: 
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest 
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of 
international law. The preceding provisions shall not however impair the right of the 
state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties.’ 
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) uses a three pronged approach to determine 
constitutionality, asking whether the measure is lawful under domestic law, whether it is a 
legitimate aim and whether it is proportionate.   The first two elements are not usually 
challenged but the question of proportionality often raises issues. In the South African case 
of Mohunram vs NDPP,38for instance, the court quashed a civil forfeiture order for a factory 
where unlicensed gaming machines were kept. It was found that even if the factory housed 
                                                          
38 Mohunram vs NDPP [2007] 2 ACC 4. 
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the machines, its forfeiture was disproportionate to the aim.  In the United Kingdom, Courts 
have found that such laws do not interfere with property rights.39 
In relation to this right, Uganda’s Constitution provides that: 
‘1)Every person has a right to own property individually or in association with others. 
2) No person shall be compulsorily deprived of property or any interest in or right 
over property of any description except where the following conditions are satisfied- 
a) the taking of possession or acquisition is necessary for public use or in the interest 
of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; and 
b) the compulsory taking of possession or acquisition  of property is made under a 
law which makes provision for- 
i) prompt payment of fair and adequate compensation, prior to the taking of 
possession or acquisition of the property; and 
ii) a right of access to a court of law by any person who has an interest or right over 
the property.’40 
 
 
The Constitution of Uganda appears to permit thedeprivation of property only where, in 
addition to other conditions, there is payment of fair and adequate compensation to the 
affected party.  Thus, civil forfeiture legislation might appear to breach the Constitution in 
relation to article 26. Hence there is a need to amend the Constitution in that respect to 
allow for deprivation of property as provided for under the civil forfeiture law and without 
making the need for compensation mandatory. 
The agency enforcing the law could refer to international legal norms that have been 
applied in other jurisdictions, as discussed here.In various jurisdictions, property usually is 
confiscated under explicit rules and only in conditions where the said property was found to 
have been obtained illegally. Some jurisdictions also rely on the theory that no one can 
                                                          
39 See R vs He & Chen [2004] EWHC 3021 Admin. 
40 Article 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995. 
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acquire title in property that has been acquired illegally. Thus, the right to own property is 
not violated in such cases.41 
4.3.3 Retroactivity of Civil Forfeiture Legislation 
 
In order to cast the net as wide as possible, legislators should consider retroactive 
application of the new law. Uganda has suffered an insurmountable asset loss to corruption 
in recent years. Retroactive application of civil forfeiture would allow for the recovery of 
assets derived from offences committed before the statute came into existence, provided 
that the conduct was criminalised at the time. 
Many jurisdictions have adjudicated on issues concerning the constitutionality of 
retrospective civil forfeiture legislation. Criminal law prohibits the enactment of legislation 
to try an act which was not defined as a crime at the time of commission. In the same way, 
it also prohibits meting out heavier penalties than were prescribed legally at the time of 
commission of the offence. However, civil forfeiture is not a criminal process, but rather a 
civil one, and is thus not subject to the principle prohibiting the enactment ofex post facto 
legislation. Various courts in both civil and common law jurisdictions have found also that 
civil forfeiture cannot be defined as a punishment because it is not criminal in nature.42 It is 
a civil consequence of an unlawful act from which an accused person has derived a certain 
benefit.43 
 
 
                                                          
41 Greenberg (2009) 45. 
42 Greenberg (2009) 45. 
43 Greenberg (2009) 45. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
The efforts to introduce civil forfeiture in Uganda, including the Anti-Corruption 
(Amendment) Bill (2013) and the Proceeds of Corruption Assets Recovery Bill (2013) are 
laudable. However, for the new legislation to be effective and comprehensive, provision 
should be made for the basic elements of civil forfeiture, including the nature of property 
recoverable, establishment of enforcement agencies and international co-operation and 
mutual legal assistance. 
Different jurisprudence in various jurisdictions has been used to challenge the 
constitutionality of civil forfeiture legislation and its perceived violation of certain protected 
rights. However, it has been recognised generally that civil forfeiture is a necessary remedy 
where criminal prosecution is not possible. Of course, civil legislation must be in line with 
international human right norms of legality, necessity and proportionality and should not 
offend against the Constitution of any given state. In the case of Uganda, amendments to 
the Constitution should be considered to ensure that the new civil forfeiture law is not open 
challenge as violating the constitutionally protected right to property. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1  Conclusion 
 
Uganda, like many other developing countries, is faced with high levels of corruption among 
public officials. Estimates show that the country has one of the highest levels of corruption 
in East Africa. This has led to enormous loss of public funds as officials divert these funds for 
private use. 
Although the Anti-Corruption Act provides for prosecution of corrupt officials, many times 
powerful and highly placed officials avoid indictment or conviction due to insufficient 
evidence, immunity, and the fact that they are too powerful to be indicted. As a result, 
mainly the lower level technical staff are indicted and convicted at the Anti-Corruption 
Court. This means that even if the Act expressly provides for criminal confiscation, this 
cannot be applied effectively in relation to such officials.  
Civil forfeiture, which allows for confiscation of corruptly acquired assets without 
conviction, would address existing loopholes. Civil forfeiture is applicable in situations 
where there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction, where the accused person 
absconds or dies before criminal proceedings against him can commence or be concluded. It 
may apply also where an individual has been acquitted or where domestic immunity is a bar 
to prosecution. It is also easier for the prosecution to prove since the standard of proof is 
proof on a balance of probabilities 
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The United Nations Convention against Corruption requires states parties to consider 
enacting legislation in relation to civil forfeiture. It also requires states parties to establish 
such measures that would allow for institution and enforcement of civil proceedings, 
including civil forfeiture. Other international and regional anti-corruption conventions, 
including the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and the 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, also provide for civil 
forfeiture although by implication. Uganda is a party to these conventions and 
consequently, should honour her commitments under these conventions in relation to civil 
forfeiture. 
Under domestic law, the Anti-Corruption Act of 2009 and the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 
2013 provide expressly for criminal forfeiture. This has been applied in a considerable 
number of cases. Both Acts also provide for civil forfeiture. However, this is by implication 
and only in cases of death or flight of an accused person. The Leadership Code Act of 2002 
allows only for administrative forfeiture. Another issue is that Uganda’s legal regime on 
asset recovery is not fully developed and comprehensive. It is also set out in different laws 
which contain different provisions. 
The Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Bill, a private member’s bill, and the Proceeds of 
Corruption Assets Recovery Bill (2013), which is a government effort, seek to introduce civil 
forfeiture of corruptly acquired assets.  In order to ensure effectiveness of the new laws, 
salient issues relating to civil forfeiture need to be considered. 
These include precise definition of the nature of assets or property that would be subject to 
civil forfeiture. This would require proper consideration of definitions of the term proceeds, 
allowing for use of substitute assets, how to deal with commingled proceeds and foreign 
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assets.  There is also a need to consider the establishment of enforcement bodies that 
would implement the provisions of the new law.  
It is also important to take note of the principal constitutional and human rights challenges 
that have been raised against the application of civil forfeiture legislation in different 
jurisdictions. 
5.2     Recommendations 
5.2.1       Establishment of Enforcement Bodies 
 
Uganda does not have an asset forfeiture unit. It would be sensible to establish an asset 
forfeiture unit that will be responsible for applications for both civil and criminal forfeiture. 
The unit would manage proceeds and instrumentalities that have been restrained or 
confiscated. This would ensure effectiveness of the Anti-Money Laundering Act which does 
not provide for an asset forfeiture unit but instead tasks an applicant or an authorised 
officer to carry out functions under the Act. 
The Anti-Corruption Act 2009 empowers the DPP and the IGG to carry out investigations. 
The new legislation should provide for these institutions to be in charge of all civil forfeiture 
related investigations. 
An asset recovery fund should be established which will meet expenses for the management 
and maintenance of preserved and confiscation property. The fund will also manage money 
realised from the sale of confiscated assets and meet other expenses related to civil 
forfeiture. 
The Constitution provides for the establishment for a Leadership Code Tribunal.  This should 
be established to enable administrative confiscation in addition to civil forfeiture.  
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5.2.2    Harmonising Laws on Confiscation 
 
Article 26 of the Constitution requires, inter alia, that property can be expropriated only in 
circumstances where there is adequate and fair compensation in relation to the 
expropriation. A strict interpretation of this provision would require compensation in cases 
of civil forfeiture. 
Thus, there is a need to amend the Constitution to allow expressly for confiscation of 
property where it has been acquired illegally and without requiring compensation in such 
circumstances. 
In order to ensure effectiveness, it is necessary to harmonise existing laws, including the 
Anti-Corruption Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Act and the Leadership Code Act on 
confiscation to avoid duplication. Currently, the Anti-Corruption Act and the Anti-Money 
Laundering Act provide for civil and criminal forfeiture but establish different procedures. 
This is bound to cause confusion in the application of these procedures. The laws therefore 
should be harmonised to ensure effectiveness of civil forfeiture and to avoid replication of 
procedures. 
The Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Bill (2013) and the Proceeds of Corruption Assets 
Recovery Bill, 2013 are two efforts that propose to introduce the recovery of corruptly 
acquired assets without the need for conviction. To avoid depletion of resources, it is 
desirable to harmonise the two bills to avoid duplication and ensure effectiveness in 
introducing civil forfeiture. 
The Anti-Money Laundering Act provides for drafting of administrative rules to ensure 
management of restrained and confiscated property but these have not been enacted yet. 
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Enacting these rules would ensure effectiveness of the Proceeds of Corruption Assets 
Recovery Bill.  
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